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This paper discusses how economic systems can be described by the manner that property rights 
are allocated to individuals, to the government, or to interests groups.  Property rights entail 
control of use of assets, claim on the net income from an asset, and transferability of the previous 
two.  Economics systems (e.g., capitalism, socialism, cronyism) are characterized by who holds 
these rights, in whole or in part, and this determines the success or failure of an economy.  A 
related analysis is applied to understanding business organization, e.g., the corporate and non-
corporate form, franchising, and employee compensation methods.  Each entails a (voluntary) 
allocation of the three aspects of property rights to different individuals and each has benefits 
and costs.  Several examples are discussed.  Competition selects the most efficient form of 
organization.  This illustrates the importance of the private ownership of property rights, where 
parties may trade and divide them, for the success of businesses and the economy as a whole.    
*For support, I wish to thank the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise at the University of
Kentucky.
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I. Introduction 
 This paper analyzes comparative economics systems and managerial economics with a 
unifying theme of the allocation and exchange of property rights.  It is argued that all economic 
systems, e.g., capitalism, socialism, and so on, are understood as different ways in which three 
basic aspects of property rights are allocated.  Additionally, we discuss how the allocation of the 
same three aspects of property rights are at the core of much of managerial economics.   
Section II of the paper describes the three aspects of property rights:  control over use of 
assets, claim on the net income (or enjoyment) from the assets, and transferability (alienability) 
of the previous two.  Section III of the paper examines a number of economic systems and shows 
how each is described by the manner in which property rights are allocated.  So, for example, in 
a capitalist system, each of the above noted aspects of property rights are held predominately by 
individuals (or their designees).  With socialism, these rights are largely held by the government.  
In welfare states, such as those in the Scandinavian countries, these rights are divided, where the 
government (through taxation) holds much of the rights to income.  In part A of section IV, the 
importance of the private ownership of property is discussed, with focus on how it enables 
unifying decision-making rights over how assets are used on one hand, with incentives and 
relevant knowledge on the other.   
Part B of section IV works through a number of examples on how private owners may 
divide the three aspects of property rights.  Examples include corporations, franchising, and 
employee compensation.  Each organizational form divides property rights differently and the 
nature of the division characterizes the organization.  Each has its benefits and costs and, in a 
competitive market, those that are most efficient survive and thrive.  This further illustrates the 
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importance of private ownership of each aspect of property rights, with competition among 
different styles of organizations.  Lastly, section V concludes.     
II. What Are Property Rights? 
 The terms “property rights” and “ownership” are often used interchangeably and indeed 
are closely linked.  Ownership of a good or asset – whether the asset is physical, intangible, 
brainpower, etc. – consists of three rights.  This is equivalent to property rights.1  These three 
rights are below.  
1. Control of over use of the good or asset.  Owners decide how assets are deployed.  There 
is the presumption that each owner’s deployment does not interfere with another owner’s.  
Otherwise, one’s deployment partly determines another’s, in contradiction to this aspect 
of ownership.     
2. Claim on the residual income (e.g., net income) from an asset or the enjoyment from use 
of the asset.  Owners have claim on the net income from the asset or may enjoy its use.  
3. Transferability (alienability) of the above two rights.  Owners may sell the rights of 
control and of residual claims.  They may divide each of them into parts and/or divide 
them from one another.   Also, transferability itself may be retained or sold by owners. 
Thus, to say that you “own” an asset is to say that you control how it is used, have claim on 
income produced and/or non-pecuniary enjoyment from the asset, and may sell either of the 
above two.  Consider several examples to illustrate these rights may be sold or divided.  These 
are in the context of individual ownership of these rights since this a familiar setting.  One 
example is where owners of firms sell common stock.  This is the sale of residual income claims 
                                                          
1 These aspects of property rights are discussed in several places in the literature.  See, for example, 
Alchian (undated), Alchian and Allen (1969), and Blair (1995).   
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(right 2) with very little, if any, control rights (right 1).  Managers retain most control rights.  If 
the stock is traded on an exchange, stockholders have transferability of right 2.  Another example 
is the following.  Those who loan a lot of money (i.e., buy large amounts of debt) to a small firm 
may also require that they be awarded some decision-making power in the firms they invest in.  
Thus some control rights are transferred, but not residual claims since debt requires a fixed 
payment, not a share of the net residual income.  Consider yet another example.  In privately-
held corporations, those who become owners gain some control rights and residual claims, but 
the purchase agreement may restrict reselling these rights.  Thus, transferability is restricted.  
Thus, even though rights 1 through 3 are in private hands, they may be voluntarily separated.  
There are various reasons why organizations divide ownership in various ways and some of the 
basics are discussed below.2   
The same basic ideas apply to human resources as well, though there are some differences.  
Buyers of labor services essential rent the skill sets and brainpower of the workers in question for 
a specified time and rate.   In many employment settings, employees cede the right to direct their 
deployment to employers, within certain bounds.  Employees sometimes contract for part of the 
residual claims from the use of their services, though often do not.  For example, there may be 
profit sharing, commissions, and piece work.  Human assets are not directly bought and sold, but 
there is transferability.  By quitting and taking another job, a worker transfers the control and 
residual claims due to his/her skills from one employer to another.  Firms that raid another’s 
employees accomplishes the same thing.  If one firm acquires another, the control rights and 
residual claims from extant human resources are transferred to the acquiring firm.  Also, workers 
                                                          
2 Regarding rights of control, Grossman and Hart (1986) make a noteworthy distinction between 
contractual rights and residual rights.  The latter are non-contractible control rights.  Both refer to the 
same element of ownership though.   
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may decide to be self-employed and direct their own efforts and retain residual claims.  Thus, 
even with labor services, there is a substantial aspect of transferability.   
III. The Division of Property Rights Defines Economic Systems 
All economic systems allocate rights 1 through 3 in various ways.  Each is characterized 
by the way these rights are allocated.  Here, a number of leading examples are discussed.  
 
Capitalism.  Rights 1 through 3 are privately held.  A single individual may hold all  
 
three or they may be contractually divided among multiple private parties.  However, they  
 
remain privately held.  
 
 
 Note that it is difficult to have 100% private ownership.  With capitalism, the 
establishment and enforcement of the above rights requires property and contract law that are 
understood and largely accepted by parties.  The first – property law – determines an accepted 
set of rules about which private party owns what.  The second – contract law – are rules that 
guide how private transfers/trades are made.  Many advocates of a capitalist economy indicate 
that this is the role of government.  Naturally, some level of taxation and government 
expenditure is required for a government to undertake these functions.  Taxation makes a claim 
on the income from assets, both human and non-human.  Thus, even a capitalist system does not 
allocate all of right 2 (residual claims) to individuals.  
 There are situations where property rights are difficult to define, enforce, and trade 3   A 
typical example is environmental pollution.  Failing to resolve this with use of property rights 
                                                          
3 Demsetz (1967) indicates that property and contract law will emerge only if the resources in question are 
scarce enough so their value exceeds the cost of establishing and enforcing relevant law.  Thus, for some 
goods, ownership may be ill-defined even in a capitalist setting.  
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generates externalities.  In this setting, governments might step in to control use of pollution-
generating assets even in a largely capitalist economy.  
 A strong form of capitalism is that rights 1 through 3 are presumed to be held by 
individuals and removed from individuals only in special circumstances, such as in the example 
of environmental pollution or in the cases of theft, violence, or fraud.  In the latter cases, 
individuals engaging in those acts violate the property rights of others, so might be punished by 
fines or imprisonment.  These entail loss of individual residual claimancy and control rights.  
However, in the strong form of capitalism, government is empowered to do this only if there is 
demonstrable violation of another’s rights.  
 A weak form of capitalism is the presumption that rights 1 through 3 may be awarded to 
individuals with permission from government and the government, in turn, allows individuals to 
hold these rights.  This is a weak form because of capitalism since the power to remove rights 1 
through 3 fundamentally gives government underlying control of those rights.   
 Political economy/public choice considerations determine whether government has the  
 
limited powers in the strong form of capitalism or the greater powers of the weak form and, in  
 
the latter case, how those powers are exercised. 
 
 
Socialism. Rights 1 through 3 are held by a central authority, i.e., “the government.”  This  
 
authority determines how assets are used, who has claim on production and use, and how these  
 
may be transferred across individuals.  
 
 
This is the polar opposite case of capitalism.  Here, individuals hold none of these rights 
and the government holds them all.  Generally, this entails some form of central planning of the 
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output and distribution of goods and services, of the allocation of resource inputs, and of prices, 
wages, and incomes.   
As above, 100% government ownership is not achievable.  Governments cannot feasibly 
control all uses of assets.  For example, equipment and land might be surreptitiously utilized by 
farmers and manufacturers for personal use.  Human capital can be privately directed by 
neglecting official duties and working for personal gain.4  Also, black markets may emerge 
where individuals determine trades and income claims.   
Presumably, socialism can take various forms.  Authoritarian socialism is where the 
government holds rights 1 through 3 with absolute power and with no legal restraints.  
Communism is where private ownership is abolished and ownership is awarded to a specific 
collective entity; the proletariat.  Whatever form of government that emerges from “the 
proletariat” holds rights 1 through 3.  It is thought that socialism can emerge from a 
democratic/majoritarian process as well; i.e., democratic socialism.5  This presumably occurs 
where a pluralistic voting process opts for government ownership of rights 1 through 3.  Of 
course, there is no guarantee that a pluralistic voting process would support socialism.  Also, in 
each of these, the specific political/economic forces at play determine what form of socialism (or 
other economic system) occurs.           
 
Fascism.  Rights 1 through 3 are held by a ruling group of major entities in the economy and 
society; the government, big business associations, and major labor unions.  Decisions are made 
by the group, though the government makes final approval of the decisions.   
 
                                                          
4 The issue of diverting asset use away from that desired by the owner is a problem confronted by 
capitalist owners as well.  This is an issue of enforcing property and contract rights and pervades all 
transactions, regardless of the economic system.   
5 This differs from “social democracy,” which is discussed below.  
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Decision making authority is awarded to industrial associations and labor unions 
regarding production, prices, and wages.  Thus, use of assets and income claimancy are 
determined by these groups, and so it seems that private parties hold property rights.  However, 
this is largely an illusion.  One reason is that decisions must be approved by the government. 
Thus, fundamentally, the government controls production, prices, and wages and so indirectly 
holds rights 1 through 3.  The government may approve the business associations’ and unions’ 
plans and allow private decision makers to get their way, giving the appearance of private 
ownership.  However, the power of government to negate those decision means that government 
holds the rights. This is a case where the presumption is that the rights are held by the 
government, but may be granted to others. 
A second reason why this system is illusory private ownership is the following.  Even if 
the private associations and unions are allowed by the government to implement their plans, this 
does not enable general private holding of rights.  If an entrepreneur wishes to use his/her assets 
to enter a market and produce a good or services, the government prevents it since is does not 
follow the approved plan.  Similarly, attempts by companies to cut prices, or by workers to 
accept lower wages, are thwarted by the government.  Thus, individuals are not allowed to 
control use of their assets nor to gain income for those uses.  The private holding of rights is not 
upheld generally.   
 
The Welfare State.  This is characterized by very high levels of taxation that support very high  
 
levels of subsidization of certain goods, typically food, housing, education, medical care, and 
leisure.  Private control of assets is largely retained, as is transferability.  However, claims on net 
income is deeply abrogated due to the high levels of taxation.     
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While rights 1 and 3 largely remain in place, the attenuation of right 2 – residual income 
claimancy – removes a great deal of the incentive to effectively create and deploy assets (e.g., to 
invest and work), as well as to seek out value-increasing asset transfers.  If income claimancy is 
eroded enough, there is little to be gained by efficiently exercising rights 1 and 3.  This scenario 
is often blamed for the persistent low economic growth of many European countries that 
proximate the welfare state.     
Sweden, and a host of other countries, have adopted welfare state-like economies and one 
often hears question, “Is Sweden socialist?”  The above analysis implies that the answer is “no” 
since rights 1 and 3 are still largely in private hands.  However, it is clear that Sweden – and 
countries with similar economic systems – removes a great deal of the right to residual income 
claims from individuals and awards it to government.       
The term “social democracy” is often used almost synonymously with the term “welfare 
state.”  However, most modern definitions of social democracy indicate that the term also entails 
a good deal of regulation of the private sector.6  This involves government activity beyond 
enforcement of privately held rights and private contracts.  It may potentially include 
government control or influence over pricing, employment, wages, production, and entry into 
markets.  Note, though, that these latter items pertain to how assets are used and transferred.  
Thus, as the scope of government regulation grows and deepens in these respects, it becomes 
more and more like government ownership of rights 1 and 3.  
 
Interventionism.  This is a term coined by von Mises (2008) that is little used, but captures a 
good deal of government activity that occurs.  It refers to a host of partial and piecemeal 
                                                          
6 See, for example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_democracy.  Also, there is a political dimension 
to modern definitions, i.e., that there is a pluralistic voting process to select political leaders.       
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government controls over markets, firms, workers, and consumers.  These include government 
entry barriers, wage and price controls, limits on profits, interest rate restrictions, regulations, 
taxes, subsidies, and tariffs and quotas.  Each represents moving some aspects of rights 1 through 
3 from individuals to government.   
 
Consider the case of barriers to entry into markets.  This prevents potential entrants from 
deploying their assets to serve certain markets.  Thus, some individual control of asset use is lost.  
Wage, price, and interest rate controls disallow some private transactions to transfer 
assets/goods, thus remove parts of rights of transfer from individuals.  Regulations impinge on 
individual rights to use assets and to engage in trade/transfers.  Profit limitations reduce 
individual income claimancy.  Tariffs and quotas limit individual rights to trade/transfer assets 
with foreign parties.  The effects of these policies and other government interventions have been 
fruitfully analyzed, but the point here is that each entails altering the allocation of rights 1 
through 3.   
 
Cronyism.  This term is often not carefully defined.  Essentially, though, it refers to the case 
where a select group of government “cronies” has control or influence regarding the 
determination of rights 1 through 3.   
 
An extreme form of cronyism is the fascist economic model, where big business and 
large labor unions have a dominant influence over production, distribution, prices, and wages.  
Though government must approve these plans, rights 1 through 3 are not held by individuals, but 
by the “cronies” and the government.  Less extreme forms of cronyism are cases where cronies 
have a strong influence over specific government policies.  This includes the case of powerful 
special interest groups that influence the host of government polices noted under 
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interventionism, e.g., entry barriers, favorable regulation, taxes, subsidies, and so on.  Cronies 
have, indirectly, a degree of control of these policies.  Thus, they gain rights 1 through 3 in 
partial and piecemeal ways.  Those who are not cronies partially lose these rights.    
There are other economic systems one might consider, as well as hybrids of the above.  In 
each case, which system emerges depends on political economy/public choice considerations in 
each particular setting.7  This paper does not explain which system occurs where.  But regardless 
of the system, it can be characterized by which parties gain rights 1 through 3.  Capitalism is the 
only system where individuals hold these rights.  In all others systems, to one degree or another, 
they are attained by a ruling or politically influential group.   
IV. Property Rights and Economic and Business Organization Success 
 A great deal has been written about the success or failure of economic systems and of 
individual organizations.  Part A of this section reviews some underlying principles to 
understand this, illustrating the importance of property rights and the success or failure of 
economic systems.  Part B provides several examples to show how the private allocation of the 
above three rights is often the key to a business organization’s success.   
A. Property Rights and Economic System Success 
Regarding economic organization, Hayek (1945) emphasized the importance of 
combining decision rights over the use of assets on one hand, with knowledge of the situation on 
the other.  He noted that a great deal of knowledge is imbedded in particular circumstances and is 
not easily transmitted to third parties.  Thus, in order to utilize the relevant knowledge to allocate 
assets efficiently, decision making must be devolved/decentralized to those “on the spot.”  This 
is Hayek’s (1945) essential argument as to why government central planning results in poor 
                                                          
7 A related and intermingled issue is the how the political system emerges, e.g., an authoritarian rule or 
majority driven.  
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outcomes – the central planners making the decisions cannot obtain a great deal of the relevant 
information.   
This line of argument is expanded upon by Jensen and Meckling (1992) where they 
incorporate the importance of incentives.  They argue that decision rights, incentives, and 
knowledge are ideally united (or co-located, to use their term) in order to attain efficient asset 
use.  The basic idea is that if those who decide how assets are used also have the relevant 
knowledge as well as the appropriate incentives, then assets are likely to be used efficiently.   
 Jensen and Meckling (1992) indicate that markets tend to unite decision rights, 
incentives, and relevant knowledge.  Note the close relationship to property rights 1 through 3.  
Decision rights regarding how assets are used is right 1.  Transferability (right 3) entails that 
those who are the most knowledgeable about specific markets can acquire the assets that they are 
knowledgeable about.  Residual claims (right 2) provides the incentive to do these in value-
increasing ways.  This illustrates a further contrast with centrally planned economies.  Central 
planners typically have neither the knowledge of particular circumstances about how assets 
should be used, nor the incentives to allocate them effectively.  These are the essential reasons 
why market economies outperform centrally planned ones.8  Moreover, the same logic applies to 
situations where control of rights 1 through 3 are removed from private parties on a piecemeal 
basis, such as with entry restrictions, price controls, taxes, and subsidies.  The end result is 
poorer economic performance in those markets where this occurs.    
 Though markets tend to unite decision authority, knowledge, and incentives, they also 
allow private parties to divide them.  This is accomplished by using right 3 (rights to transfer) to 
                                                          
8 This has been studied a great deal.  For example, see O’Driscoll and Hoskins (2003) on the importance 
of good private property rights for economic development.  Also, private property rights are an important 
element of economic freedom indices and the latter has been shown to be important for economic 
prosperity.  See, for example, Gwartney, et. al. (2018).   
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engage in exchanges of rights 1 and 2.  Though there are strong forces to unite ownership of 
rights 1 through 3 – thereby uniting decision rights, incentives, and knowledge – private 
ownership also enables them to separate.  An important and interesting issue is why private 
parties would separate these rights.   
B. Organizational Form and Dividing Property Rights 
 Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) discuss conditions under 
which separation or division of decision rights from incentives and/or knowledge might occur.  
This implies dividing rights 1 through 3.  There are various ways to do this and the manner in 
which it is done often implicitly describes different organizational forms.  Some work well in 
certain circumstances and others in different circumstances.  Those organizational forms that 
work well provide the good or service in question at lower cost and/or provide something of 
higher value to the consumer.  In a competitive world, these organizations will outcompete 
organizational forms that do a lesser job in these respects.  Thus, the benefits of dividing rights 1 
through 3 must outweigh the costs in specific situations.  Otherwise, firms that do so would not 
survive.   
This implies that a key to good management – and long-term survival in a competitive 
marketplace – is selecting the appropriate organizational form that suits the particular situation.   
Indeed, if management fails to do so, the competitive process will implicitly do so by replacing 
inefficient firms with efficient ones.  Below are discussions of several examples of 
organizational forms, how they divide rights 1 through 3, and why they may be efficient in 
certain circumstances.    
 
Sole Proprietorship.  This is where rights 1 through 3 are held by a single individual.  Clearly, 
this unites decision rights and incentives.  Those with the most relevant knowledge about a 
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market settings have strong incentives to acquire the decision rights and residual claims 
regarding assets they are most knowledgeable about.  This brings the relevant knowledge 
together with decision rights and incentives.  Small private partnerships are similar to 
proprietorships except that rights 1 through 3 are held by a small group of individuals.   
 
Corporations.  Consider that the large, publically traded corporation in this example.  Here, 
decision rights over the use of assets are (mostly) separated from claims on residual income.  
Managers of big corporations hold most of the decision rights and stockholders hold most of the 
residual claims.  This division of rights separates, to a significant degree, decision rights from 
incentives.  Managers who deploy assets have the everyday knowledge of the companies they 
manage, but do not feel most of the effects of their decisions.  Their decisions affect the stock 
price and it is mostly the stockholders who enjoy the benefits or bear the costs of changes in the 
stock price caused by managers.  Thus, manager incentives are abated and agency costs are 
incurred.9  This has been recognized for a long time and its modern analysis was launched by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).  They point out that there must be a reason for diluting the 
incentives of managers.  Doing so incurs agency costs, so there must be more-than-offsetting 
benefits.  There are several possibilities for this. For example, if a lot of capital is required for 
efficiency, one can draw upon many people as shareholders who have funds to invest but no 
expertise in management of the firm in question.  Those with expertise but limited funds can 
remain as managers. Thus, it may be worthwhile to incur some agency costs of the large 
corporate form if the greater efficiency from the additional capital is more than offsetting. 
                                                          
9 There is a substantial literature analyzing practices that might limit these agency costs or restore 
manager incentives.  These include manager performance bonuses, boards of directors to monitor 
managers, and corporate takeovers.   For discussion, see Fama and Jensen (1983b).   
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 A successful business will adopt the corporate form if this holds and will not if it doesn’t.  
A competitive economy with privately held property rights thus incentivizes finding the most 
efficient business form.  
 As an aside, consider the term “the separation of ownership and control” that is often 
used to describe large corporations.  This misleading terminology.  Control is an aspect of 
ownership and is not distinct from it.  Those who use this term are really referring to the 
separation of residual claims from control of asset use.  The key questions in this literature are: 
(i) whether the benefit of separating the two is worth the cost, and; (ii) whether private parties are 
enabled to make those calls, which are then put to the market test.  Under a capitalist system, 
private parties are enabled to make those calls and are incentivized to make decisions where the 
benefits exceed the costs.   
 
Franchising.  This is another case where rights 1 through 3 are divided.  Franchisees typically 
get a substantial share of the residual income from the franchise unit, but not all.  Franchisees 
have decision rights over some things (e.g., personnel, day-to-day operations) but the franchisor 
has control over others (e.g., equipment, business routine, branding).  Franchisees may transfer 
their rights by selling the franchise, though typically only with approval by the franchisor.   
This division/separation of rights generates benefits as well as costs.  Granting decision 
rights to franchisees over day-to-operations makes sense since they have the necessary everyday 
operational knowledge.  Similarly, franchisors likely have the relevant knowledge of brand 
building and the business routine and so have decision authority in those respects.  Thus, parties 
have decision rights over things that they know best.  This unites knowledge and decision 
authority. But how can one unify incentives with knowledge and decision rights?  An important 
way to incentivize franchisees is to allow them to keep a large share of the net income of the 
15 
 
franchise unit they operate.10   However, a large share for franchisees means a lower share for the 
franchisor, thereby abating the latter’s incentives.  Ultimately, the division of net income 
depends on which party’s incentives are most important, as well as other factors.11    
The overarching point, however, is the following.  Franchising is a system of transferring 
some degree of claim on net income and some decision rights to franchisees, with the franchisor 
retaining some.  In a competitive setting, businesses that adopt this organizational form will 
succeed only if the benefits exceed the costs, i.e., it is more efficient than alternatives.  Private 
ownership of the three aspects of property rights 1 through 3 enables businesses to select this, or 
other, organizational forms.   
   
Workplace Organization and Compensation.  Employee work routines and methods of 
compensation may differ greatly.  For example, offsite sales personnel are often compensated by 
commissions and allowed set their own hours.  In this setting, they likely have the best 
knowledge of how to make sales, know the best work routines to follow, and are rewarded for 
successfully doing so.  Knowledge, decision rights (to some degree), and incentives are united.  
However, there are employees for which it is not feasible to do so.  Consider the example of 
office clerical staff.  They are usually paid by salary or by the hour.  It is usually difficult to 
develop good, direct incentives in this setting.  Do you reward keystrokes typed on memos and 
letters, number of calls taken, or similar criteria?  These are problematic since they measure only 
quantity and not the quality or value of the work done.  Thus, direct incentives do not work.  
Since there are no strong incentives, it is not sensible to award decision rights to employees over 
their hours, work routine, and equipment use.  The costs of awarding decision rights to clerical 
                                                          
10 Rubin (1978) was the first to analyze franchising in the context of the provision of incentives.   
11 For empirical evidence in this regard, see Wimmer and Garen (1997).   
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staff exceeds the benefits because they cannot be properly incentivized.  The inability to unify 
incentives with knowledge implies that decision rights are held by another party.  The same ideas 
apply in other job settings.12 
 An organization will achieve greater success if it is able to determine the appropriate 
decision authority and incentives for its employees.  This is, in effect, transferring property rights 
in an efficient way.  Competitive markets with private ownership of rights 1 through 3 enables 
and incentivizes this to happen.  The successful organization finds the compensation methods, 
work routines, and employee decision authority where the benefit exceeds the costs.   
There are numerous other examples of business practices that involve dividing or uniting 
decision rights, incentives, and knowledge.  Examples include establishing exclusive territories 
for retailers, use of resale price maintenance, use of joint ventures, financial cooperatives, and 
nonprofit organizations.  This paper does not attempt to analyze each of these, but in each, the 
above ideas apply.13  There are costs and benefits of uniting or dividing decision rights, 
knowledge, and incentives.  Privately held rights in a competitive setting induce organizations to 
choose those for which the benefits exceed the costs.    
V. Conclusion 
 The analysis of property rights has proven to be an extremely fruitful approach to 
understanding a great deal about economic systems and business organizations.  This paper 
reiterates the meaning of property rights/ownership – entailing control of use, claim on residual 
income, and transferability – and illustrates how it is a unifying theme that defines economic 
systems.  How property rights are allocated to individuals, to government, or to selected interest 
                                                          
12 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) for a theoretical presentation of these ideas and Garen (2004) for 
related empirical work.   
13 For excellent discussions of these and related business practices, see Rubin (1990) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983a). 
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groups – in whole or in part – essentially defines an economic system.  Indeed, capitalism, 
socialism, and the host of hybrids between those two can be characterized by who holds these 
rights.  Moreover, as emphasized by many authors, the allocation of property rights to private 
individuals versus government is a key to economic prosperity.   
 A related analysis applies the same reasoning to business organizations.  This paper 
illustrates how various business practices unify or separate decision rights, incentives, and 
knowledge and that this is determined by the allocation of property rights to different 
individuals.  Each allocation has different benefits and costs and so is important in determining 
the success of an organization.  Competitive markets ferret out business practices that do not pass 
the benefit/cost test.  Thus, competition and private ownership of property, where owners are 
enabled to divide ownership, are keys to business success, which ultimately translates into 
success for the economic system.   
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